Abstract

Governments devote considerable resources to providing goods and services. One observes considerable variation in public provision across goods, across countries (and other jurisdictions) and across time. Theoretical models of public provision typically assume only one good can potentially be publicly provided. Yet, an important element of the observed international and intertemporal variation is in the *proportion* of public spending that is devoted to various publicly provided goods and services, such as education, medical care, security, housing and social insurance. A model which seeks to explain that variation must allow for public provision of more than one good, and such a multi-dimensional issue space typically renders the Median Voter Theorem useless as a means of determining political outcomes. This paper embeds the 'citizen-candidate' approach to political decision-making into a model in which public provision of more than one good is possible, and derives its equilibria. The equilibrium set is shown to display a 'propensity toward public provision', in a well-defined sense.