The Chinese Saving Rate: Productivity, Old-Age Support, and Demographics*

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Abstract

In this paper, we show that a general equilibrium model that properly captures the role of family support, changes in demographics and the productivity growth rate is capable of generating changes in the national saving rate in China that mimic the data well. Our results suggest that most of the increase in the saving rate between 1980 and 2010 is due to the interaction between the decline in the fertility rate due to the one-child policy and the shortcomings of the old-age support programs, especially against the long-term care risks, provided by the government in China. Changes in the productivity growth rate account for the fluctuations in the saving rate during this period.

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1 Introduction

The national saving rate in China has more than doubled since 1980. Accounting for this increase, however, has been challenging. In this paper, we construct an overlapping generations model; calibrate it to some of the key features of the Chinese economy between 1980 and 2011; and investigate the role of old-age support systems, demographics, productivity growth, and income uncertainty in shaping the time path of the national saving rate. Given the prevalence of family support in China, we use a model economy that is populated with altruistic agents, as in Fuster, İmrohoğlu, and İmrohoğlu (2003 and 2007) who derive utility from their own lifetime consumption and from the felicity of their predecessors and descendants. Retired agents in our economy face health-related risks that necessitate long-term care (LTC) while working-age individuals face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The decision-making unit is the household consisting of a parent and children. Since parents care about the utility of their descendants, they save to insure them against the labor income risk, and since children are altruistic toward their parents, they support them during retirement and insure them against the LTC risk. Institutional details and changes in demographics influence the size of these intervivos transfers and saving rates.

We model the old age support system carefully, including the social security system and provision of long-term care for the elderly since the 1980s. While the Chinese government initiated a transition to a public pension system in the early 1990s, institutional care for long-term care needs is almost nonexistent.¹ According to Gu and Vlosky (2008), 80% of long-term care services and more than 50% of the costs in China in 2005 were paid by family members. While the Chinese adult children are expected to take care of their parents, the decline in the fertility rate due to the one-child policy and the aging of the population are placing strains on these traditional family responsibilities. The projected structure of families containing four grandparents and one grandchild for two adult children is expected to make it even harder for children to play a major role in taking care of the elderly in the future.

We calibrate the initial steady state to mimic the economic and demographic conditions in China in 1980 and the final steady state to an economy with the one-child policy. We shock the initial steady state by imposing the one-child policy and conduct deterministic simulations as in Chen, İmrohoğlu, and İmrohoğlu (2006, 2007) where we incorporate the key features of the social security system, LTC risk, productivity growth, and the labor income risk in China along the transition. We find that our model is capable of generating changes in the national saving rate in China that mimic the data remarkably well. Our

¹Long-term care need is defined as a status in which a person is disabled in any of the six activities of daily living (eating, dressing, bathing, getting in and out of the bed, inside transferring, and toileting) for more than 90 days.
results identify two factors as the main contributors to the changes in the national saving rate. Changes in demographics that result in less family support together with the LTC risks are responsible for most of the increase in the saving rate between 1980 and 2010. While other aspects of the old age support such as social security are calibrated to the current levels in China, the decrease in the family support itself leads to higher savings due to the existence of LTC risks. In fact, the impact of the LTC risk on savings is stronger after the year 2000 as more and more one-child cohorts start to become economically active. We find that the saving rate would have increased from 20% in the 1980s to around 25% in 2010 in the absence of the LTC risk or the one-child policy. The presence of these facts, on the other hand, results in the saving rate to rise to around 35% in 2010. We also find that the total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate accounts for most of the fluctuations in the saving rate. In this framework, periods of high TFP growth rates are as associated with periods of high marginal product of capital, resulting in high saving and investment rates.2

Our paper is closely related to a recently growing literature that finds large effects of uncertain medical expenditures on savings in life-cycle models with incomplete markets.3 In particular, Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014) find that among all types of medical expenses, LTC expenses are most important in accounting for aggregate savings in the United States. We find that the saving effects of LTC expenses are especially important in China due to the lack of public programs such as Medicaid insuring against these risks. In addition, as Chinese households gradually lose family insurance due to the one-child policy, the saving effects of LTC expenses have become more important over time.

Of course it is challenging to measure precisely the risks faced by the elderly in China. In our calibration, we use measures that reflect the weighted averages of rural and urban areas, thus abstracting from the substantial heterogeneity between these areas. Nevertheless, our calibration is unlikely to exaggerate the average risks faced by the elderly. There are several issues we abstract from in our benchmark calibration, such as medical costs other than LTC costs, increases in LTC costs due to longevity, and the sustainability of the social security system. All of these would increase concerns about old-age support in China, leading to a further increase in savings. We provide sensitivity analysis for some of these possibilities in Section 5.

Our findings contribute to the literature that has focused on the role of life-cycle and precautionary savings motives in explaining the rise in the household saving rates. For example, using a panel of Chinese households for the period 1989-2006, Chamon, Liu, and

2As Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) document, the rate of return to capital has indeed been very high in China. While there is evidence that average households may not have access to assets with high returns, (see, for example, Song, Storesletten, Wang, and Zilibotti (2014)), in a general equilibrium setting, these returns will eventually accrue to individuals in the economy.

3Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010); Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014), Zhao (2014, 2015), etc.
Prasad (2013) report that rising income uncertainty and pension reforms can account for over half of the increase in the urban household savings. In a partial equilibrium setting, Curtis, Lagauer, and Mark (2015) find demographic changes account for over half of the increase in the household saving rate. He, Ning, and Zhu (2015) report that aging and pension reform account for 14% of the increase in household saving between 1995 and 2009. Using an identification strategy through families with twins, Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013) argue that the one-child policy is responsible for 40% of the increase in the household saving rate in China. While they do not model the long-term care risk, they show that an exogenous reduction in fertility results in higher saving for retirement since expected transfers and old age support for the elderly decline. Wei and Zhang (2011), on the other hand, argue that about half of the increase in the household saving rate in China can be explained by the rising sex ratio imbalance since the late 1980s. Families with sons increase their saving rate in order to help their sons compete in the marriage market. They provide empirical evidence that households with a son save more in regions with a more skewed sex ratio. None of these papers, however, focus on the national saving rate in a general equilibrium framework. We show that incorporating features related to old age support in a general equilibrium framework together with the observed changes in TFP can indeed generate national saving rates that mimic the data remarkably well.

It is important to note that we treat China as a closed economy. While this assumption may not seem very desirable, as can be gleaned from Figure 1, saving and investment rates in China have both been increasing during this time period. Clearly, the current account surplus of China since the 1990s has been an important issue for the world economy. We leave this topic for future research and concentrate on advancing our understanding about the overall increase in the saving and investment rates. By focusing on the national saving rates, we abstract from cross sectional heterogeneity, such as heterogeneity among firms or among the rural versus urban households, as well as the differences between corporate and household saving rates. A more detailed look at these issues is also left for future research.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model used in the paper and section 3 its calibration. The quantitative findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents sensitivity analysis and Section 6 the concluding remarks.

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4 Wang and Wen (2011) argue that another popular explanation, the rise in house prices, can account for at most 5% of the increase in the aggregate saving rate. See also Choi, Lugauer, and N. Mark (2014); Chamon and Prasad (2010); Blanchard and Giavazzi (2005); Modigliani and Cao (2004); Qian (1998); Horioka and Wan (2006); Wen (2009); and He and Cao (2007) for issues related to the Chinese saving rate.

5 An exception is Banerjee, Meng, Porzio, and Qian (2014) who point out that general equilibrium effects are important in understanding the relationship between aggregate fertility and household savings.
2 The Model

2.1 Technology

There is a representative firm that produces a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production function $Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$ where $\alpha$ is the output share of capital, $K_t$ and $L_t$ are the capital and labor input at time $t$, and $A_t$ is the total factor productivity at time $t$. The growth rate of the TFP factor is $\gamma_t - 1$, where $\gamma_t = \left(\frac{A_t}{A_{t-1}}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha)}$. Capital depreciates at a constant rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$. The representative firm maximizes profits such that the rental rate of capital, $r_t$, and the wage rate $w_t$, are given by:

$$r_t = \alpha A_t (K_t/N_t)^{\alpha-1} - \delta \quad \text{and} \quad w_t = (1-\alpha) A_t (K_t/N_t)^{\alpha}.$$  \hfill (1)

2.2 Government

In our benchmark economy the government taxes both capital and labor income at rates $\tau_k$ and $\tau_e$, respectively, and uses the revenues to finance an exogenously given stream of government consumption expenditures $G_t$. A transfer that is distributed back to the individuals helps balance the government budget. In addition, the government runs a pay-as-you-go social security program that is financed by a payroll tax $\tau_{ss}$.6 This way of modeling the government misses the saving done by the Chinese government who has been investing in

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6 Both budget constraints are provided in Section 2.4.
financial and physical assets at home or abroad. In Section 5, we examine the results of a case where the government is allowed to accumulate assets and build government capital.

2.3 Households

The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents. Each period \( t \), a generation of individuals is born. All children become parents at age \( T+1 \) and face mandatory retirement at age \( R \). After retirement, individuals face random lives and can live up to \( 2T \) periods. Depending on survival, an individual’s life overlaps with his parent’s life in the first \( T \) periods and with the life of his children in the last \( T \) periods. There are two types of household composition, one where both the parent and the children are alive and another where the parent may have died (which might happen after the parent reaches the retirement age). A household lasts \( T \) periods. A dynasty is a sequence of households that belong to the same family line. At age \( T +1 \), each child becomes a parent in the next-generation household of the dynasty. The size of the population evolves over time exogenously at the rate \( g_t = 1 - n^{1/T} \), where \( n \) is the fertility rate.

Individuals in this economy derive utility from the consumption of their predecessors and descendants as in Laitner (1992). For simplicity, denote the consumption of the parent (father) with \( c_{fj} \) and the children (sons) with \( c_{sj} \) where \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, T \) is the age of the youngest member. The father and the sons pool their resources and maximize a joint objective function.

Working age individuals are endowed with one unit of labor that they supply exogenously. At birth, each individual receives a shock \( z \) that determines if his permanent lifetime labor ability is high \( (H) \) or low \( (L) \). Labor ability of the children, \( z' \), is linked to the parent’s labor ability, \( z \) by a two-state Markov process with the transition probability matrix \( \Pi(z', z) \). Labor income of both ability types have two additional components; a deterministic component \( \varepsilon_j \) representing the age-efficiency profile and a stochastic component, \( \mu_j \), faced by individuals up to age \( T \). The logarithm of the labor income shock is assumed to follow an \( AR(1) \) process given by \( \log(\mu_j) = \Theta \log(\mu_{j-1}) + \nu_j \). The disturbance term \( \nu_j \) is distributed normally with mean zero and variance \( \sigma^2 \) where \( \Theta < 1 \) captures the persistence of the shock. We discretize this process into a 3-state Markov chain using the method introduced in Tauchen (1986), and denote the corresponding transition matrix by \( \Omega(\mu', \mu) \). In addition, the value of \( \mu \) at birth is assumed to be determined by a random draw from an initial distribution \( \Omega(\mu) \).

Parents face a health risk, \( h \), that necessitates long-term care (LTC), which also follows

\(^7\)See, for example, Ma and Yi (2010).
a two-state Markov process where \( h = 0 \) represents a healthy parent without LTC needs. When \( h = 1 \), the family needs to provide LTC services to the parent. We assume that the cost of LTC services consists of two parts: a goods cost \( m \) and a time cost \( \xi \). Here, \( \xi \) represents the informal care that requires children’s time. For working individuals, the LTC cost also includes their own forgone earnings. The transition matrix for the health state is given by \( \Gamma(h', h) \).

Labor income of a family is composed of the income of the children and the income of the father. Income of the children, net of the costs of informal care, is given by \( w\varepsilon_j \mu_j z_s (n - \xi h) \) where \( w \) is the economy-wide wage rate, \( \varepsilon_j \) is labor productivity at age \( j \), and \( \mu_j \) is the stochastic component of labor income. If \( h = 0 \), the parent does not need long-term care and therefore the \( n \) children generate a total income of \( w\varepsilon_j \mu_j z_s n \). If \( h = 1 \), \( \xi \) fraction of a child’s income is devoted to taking care of the parent who needs long-term care. Before retirement, the father, whose children are \( j \) years old, receives \( w\varepsilon_j + T z_f \) as labor income. Once retired, the father faces an uncertain lifespan where \( d = 1 \) indicates a father who is alive and \( d = 0 \) indicates a deceased father. The transition matrix for \( d \) is given by \( \Lambda_j + T (d', d) \) with \( \Lambda_j + T (0, 0) = 1 \), and \( \Lambda_j + T (1, 1) \) represents the survival probabilities of the father of age \( j + T \). If alive, a retired father receives social security income, \( SS_j \). All children in the household split the remaining assets (bequests) equally when they form new households at time \( T + 1 \).

Earnings, \( e_j \), of the household with age-\( j \) children is given by:

\[
e_j = \begin{cases} 
  w\varepsilon_j \mu_j z_s (n - \xi h) + w\varepsilon_j + T z_f (1 - h) & \text{if } j + T < R \\
  w\varepsilon_j \mu_j z_s (n - \xi h) + dSS & \text{if } j + T > R.
\end{cases}
\] (2)

The budget constraint facing the household with \( n \) children is given by:

\[
a_{j+1} + n c_{s_j} + d c_{f_j} + m h = e_j (1 - \tau_{ss} - \tau_e) + a_j [1 + r_t (1 - \tau_k)] + \kappa
\] (3)

where \( r \) is the before-tax interest rate, \( \tau_e \) is the labor income tax rate, \( \tau_{ss} \) is the payroll tax rate to finance the social security program, and \( \tau_k \) is the capital income tax rate. Here, \( \kappa \) is the government transfer, which consists of two components, i.e., \( \kappa = \kappa_1 e_j + \kappa_2 \). The first component \( (\kappa_1 e_j) \) is proportional to household earnings and is used to balance the government budget constraint.\(^8\) The second component \( (\kappa_2) \) guarantees a consumption floor for the most destitute.\(^9\) Following De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) and Hubbard,

\(^{8}\)Redistributing the government surplus in a proportional way, instead of a lump-sum way, is less distorting in a life-cycle setting with an inverse u-shaped age-earnings profile. In the sensitivity analysis, we provide results for the lump-sum redistribution case as well.

\(^{9}\)Consumption, asset holdings, and earnings are transformed to eliminate the effects of labor augmenting,
Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), the value of $\kappa_2$ is determined as follows:

$$\kappa_2 = \max \{0, (n + d)\xi + mh - [e_j(1 - \tau_{ss} - \tau_e) + a_j[1 + rt(1 - \tau_k)] + \kappa_1 e_j]\}$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

We assume that when the household is on the consumption floor ($\kappa_2 > 0$), $a_{j+1} = 0$ and $c_{sj} = c_{sf} = \xi$.

The maximization problem of the household is to choose a sequence of consumption and asset holdings given the set of prices and policy parameters. The state of the household consists of age $j$; assets $a$; permanent abilities of the parent and the children $z_f$ and $z_s$, respectively; the realizations of the labor productivity shock $\mu$; and the health $h$ and mortality $d$ states faced by the elderly.\(^{10}\) Let $V_j(x)$ denote the maximized value of expected, discounted utility of age-$j$ household with the state vector $x = (a, z_f, z_s, \mu, h, d)$ where $\beta$ is the subjective time discount factor. The household’s maximization problem is given by:

$$V_j(x) = \max_{c_s, c_f, \alpha' \atop j} \left\{ \nu(c_s) + du(c_f) \right\} + \beta E[V_{j+1}(x')]$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

subject to equations 2-4, $a_j \geq 0$, $c_s \geq 0$ and $c_f \geq 0$, where

$$\tilde{V}_{j+1}(x') = \begin{cases} V_{j+1}(x') & \text{for } j = 1, 2, \ldots, T - 1 \\ nV_1(x') & \text{for } j = T \end{cases} \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

### 2.4 Equilibrium

Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium (steady state): Given a fiscal policy $(G, \tau_e, \tau_k, \tau_{ss}, SS)$ and a fertility rate $n$, a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of value functions $\{V_j(x)\}_{j=1}^T$, households’ decision rules $\{c_{j,s}(x), c_{j,f}(x), a_{j+1}(x)\}_{j=1}^T$, time-invariant measures of households $\{X_j(x)\}_{j=1}^T$ with the state vector $x = (a, z_f, z_s, \mu, h, d)$, relative prices of labor and capital $\{w, r\}$, such that:

1. Given the fiscal policy and prices, households’ decision rules solve households’ decision problem in equation 5.

2. Factor prices solve the firm’s profit maximization policy by satisfying equation 1.

\(^{10}\)All children are born at the same time with the same labor ability and face identical labor income shocks.
3. Individual and aggregate behavior are consistent:

\[ K = \sum_{j,x} a_j(x)X_j(x) \]

\[ N = \sum_{j,x} \left[ \varepsilon_j z_s (n - \xi h) + \varepsilon_{j+T} z_f (1 - h) \right] X_j(x) \]

4. The measures of households satisfy:

\[ X_{j+1}(a', z_f, z_s, \mu', h', d') = \frac{1}{n^{1/T}} \sum_{\{a,\mu,h,d:a'\}} \Omega(\mu') \Gamma(h', h) \Lambda(d', d) X_j(a, z_f, z_s, \mu, h, d), \text{ for } j < T, \]

\[ X_1(a', z_s, z_s', \mu', 1, 1) = n \sum_{\{a,\mu,h,d,z_f:a'\}} \Omega(\mu') \Pi(z_s', z_s) X_T(a, z_f, z_s, \mu, h, d) \]

where \( a' = a_{j+1}(x) \) is the optimal assets in the next period.

5. The government’s budget holds, that is, \( \sum_{j,x} \kappa_1 e_j X_j(x) = \tau_k r K + \tau_e w N - G \).

6. The social security system is self-financing, and the expenditures for the consumption floor are financed from the same budget:

\[ \sum_{j=R-T}^{T} \sum_{x} d(SS_j + \kappa_2) X_j(x) = \tau_{ss} \sum_{j,x} e_j X_j(x) \]

Our computational strategy is to start from an initial steady state that represents the Chinese economy before 1980 and then to numerically compute the equilibrium transition path of the macroeconomic aggregates generated by the model as it converges to a final steady state. Net national saving rate along the transition path for this economy is measured as \( \left( Y_t - C_t - G_t - \delta K_t \right) Y_t - \delta K_t \).

The detrended steady-state saving rate is given by \( \frac{(\gamma g - 1) \tilde{k}}{\gamma - \delta \tilde{k}} \) where \( \gamma \) and \( g \) are the gross growth rates of TFP and population, respectively.

3 Calibration

We obtain measurements for the TFP growth rate, the individual income risk, the fertility rate, government expenditures, tax rates, and the long-term care risk in China (both for the steady-state calculations and for the 1980-2011 period) using data from various sources. It is well known that there has been doubt about the accuracy of Chinese national accounts, especially about the growth rate of GDP for some time. These concerns might be especially

\[ ^{11} \text{As individuals “own” the corporations in this framework, corporate savings and household savings are not separately identified. In the data, both of these saving rates have been increasing.} \]
important in the construction of the TFP series. We use the recommendations in Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) in choosing the right series on the data needed to construct TFP and double check them against the data provided by Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015). In addition, we check the sensitivity of our results by using the TFP series provided by the Penn World Tables, which adjusts the GDP series based on the findings in Wu (2011). In Section 7 we provide detailed information about the data sources as well as a comparison of our TFP series with the one provided by the Penn World Tables.

3.1 Demographics

The model period is a year. Individuals enter the economy when they are 20 years old and live, at most, to 90 years old. They become a parent at age 55 and face mandatory retirement at age 60. At age 55, the parent and his n children (who are 20 years old) form a household. After retirement, the parent faces mortality risk. Table 1 summarizes the mortality risk at five-year age intervals, which are used to calibrate the transition matrix for d.14

Table 1: Survival Probabilities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>&lt;60</th>
<th>60</th>
<th>65</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>80</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Surv.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9815</td>
<td>.9696</td>
<td>.9479</td>
<td>.9153</td>
<td>.8642</td>
<td>.7611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the initial steady state, the fertility rate (average number of children per parent) is set to n = 2.0; that is, four children per couple, the average total fertility rate in the 1970s. The corresponding annual population growth rate is 2.0% (i.e., \( n^{1/35} - 1 = 2.0\% \)). The one-child policy implemented around the year 1980 restricts the urban population to having one child per couple and the rural population to having two children only if the first child is a girl. As the urban population was approximately 40% of the Chinese population, on average, from 1980 to 2011, we set the fertility rate to \( n = 0.65 \) in the economy with the one-child policy; that is, 1.3 children per couple (\( 0.4 \times 1 + 0.6 \times 1.5 = 1.3 \)).15 The implied

12See Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2013).
13We abstract from educational costs and their potential impact on saving rates. Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013) who analyze the saving behavior of households with twins versus single children find that the reduction in expenditures associated with a fall in the number of children tends to raise household savings even though single child households invest more in the quality of their children.
14Data are taken from the 1999 World Health Organization data (Lopez et al., 2001). The survival probability is assumed to be the same within each five-year period and along the transition.
15Population control policies in China started before 1980. However, the one-child policy that was implemented in 1979 directly targeted the number of children per family. There was heterogeneity in the implementation of the policy, but, in general, strong incentives and penalties were imposed. According to Liao (2013), single child families were given rewards such as child allowance, priority for schooling and housing while penalties included 10–20% of both parents' wages in cities and large one-time fines in rural
population growth rate at the final steady state is -1.2% (i.e., \( n^{1/35} - 1 = -1.2\% \)). Since adulthood starts at age 20, the impact of the one-child policy becomes visible 20 years into the transition. With this calibration, the elderly population share generated by the model along the transition path mimics the data reasonably well (see Figure 7).

3.2 Preferences and Technology

The utility function is assumed to take the following form: \( u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} \). The value of \( \sigma \) is set to 3, which is in the range of the values commonly used in the macroeconomics literature. The subjective time discount factor \( \beta \) is calibrated to match the saving rate in the initial steady state. The resulting value of \( \beta \) is 0.999.\(^{16}\)

Based on Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), the capital depreciation rate \( \delta \) is set to 10% and the capital share \( \alpha \) is set to 0.5. The total factor productivity \( A \) is chosen so that output per household is normalized to one. The growth rate of the TFP factor \( \gamma - 1 \) in the initial steady state is set to 6.2%, which is the average growth rate of the TFP factor in China between 1976 and 1985. We assume that the growth rate of the TFP factor in the final steady state is 2%, which is commonly considered to be the growth rate at which a developed economy eventually stabilizes. Between 1980 and 2011, we use the observed growth rates of TFP.\(^{17}\) For the period after 2011, we use the forecasts provided by Goldman Sachs (2003).\(^{18}\)

3.3 Labor Income

Labor income of the agents in our framework is composed of a deterministic age-efficiency profile \( \varepsilon_j \) and a stochastic component (faced up to age 55) given by \( \log(\mu_j) = \Theta \log(\mu_{j-1}) + \nu_j \). In our benchmark calibration, we assume that agents face the same income risk at the steady-state and along the transition.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\)Note that the implied time discount factor in the model is lower than the value of \( \beta \) as individuals also face mortality risk. Results with a lower \( \beta \) affect the overall saving rate but not its time path, the main focus of the paper.

\(^{17}\)We construct the TFP series between 1980 and 2011 using \( A_t = \frac{Y_t}{K_t^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha}} \). In Section 7, we provide detailed information about the data sources.

\(^{18}\)As the forecasts are available only until 2050, we simply fix the growth rate of the TFP factor at 2% after 2050.

\(^{19}\)In Section 5, we provide sensitivity analysis to different assumptions about the start of the labor income risk. As discussed in He, Huang, Liu, and Zhu (2014), the labor market reforms that took place in the late 1990s, leading to mass layoffs in state-owned enterprises, might have increased the labor income uncertainty in China.
He, Ning, and Zhu (2015), we take $\theta = 0.86$ and the variance $\sigma^2$ as 0.06. We discretize this process into a 3-state Markov chain by using the Tauchen (1986) method. The resulting values for $\mu$ are \{0.36; 1.0; 2.7\} and the transition matrix is given in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mu'$</th>
<th>$\mu' = 1$</th>
<th>$\mu' = 2$</th>
<th>$\mu' = 3$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mu = 1$</td>
<td>0.9259</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu = 2$</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.0235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu = 3$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>0.9259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We take the age-specific labor efficiencies, $\varepsilon_j$ from He, Ning, and Zhu (2015) who use the data in CHNS to estimate them. Permanent lifetime labor ability $z \in \{H, L\}$, where the high and low states represent high school graduates and non-high school graduates, respectively, is also calibrated using the CHNS according to which the average wage rate of high school graduates is approximately 1.79 times higher than that of high school dropouts. Therefore, the value of $L$ is normalized to one and the value of $H$ is set to 1.79. The values for the transition probabilities for $z$ are calibrated to match the following two observations. First, the proportion of Chinese working-age population that are high school graduates is 46%. Second, the correlation between the income of parents and children is 0.63, according to the estimates by Gong, Leigh, and Meng (2012). These observations imply the transition probabilities for labor ability shock $z$ shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$z$</th>
<th>$z' = L$</th>
<th>$z' = H$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.4 Long-Term Care Risk

Calibrating the health shock that necessitates LTC and the expenditures associated with LTC is a key component of our study. Using data from the 2005 wave of the Chinese Longitudinal Healthy Longevity Survey, Gu and Vlosky (2008) report that about 5.8% of the Chinese elderly needed LTC in 2005. Based on this information, we set the transition probabilities for LTC shock such that 5.8% of parents will need LTC in a given year. Table 4 presents the resulting transition matrix for LTC shock. This transition matrix also implies

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20Yu and Zhu (2013) replicate the exercises in Guvenen (2009) to estimate the stochastic process for household income using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). We use their estimates for the persistent shock from the Restricted Income Processes (RIP) model (Table C) for the 1989-2009 period. He, Ning, and Zhu (2015) also provide very similar estimates.
that, on average, a parent has a 50% chance of ever needing LTC services in his life, which is consistent with some empirical estimates in the literature. For instance, using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder (2014) find that men and women aged 50 have a 50 and 65 percent chance, respectively, of ever needing long-term care.

Table 4: LTC Shock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$h' = 0$</th>
<th>$h' = 1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$h = 0$</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h = 1$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the 2005 CLHLS data, the average observed yearly cost of long-term care among those who needed it was RMB 3,606, which corresponds to 34% of disposable income per capita in 2005. However, Gu and Vlosky (2008) report that, currently, institutional care accounts for less than 10% of all the care provided for LTC, and the reported expenditures for LTC do not include the time spent by family members who provide informal care. Therefore, we assume that the goods cost of LTC services $m$ is 34% of disposable income per person in the model, while the time cost of LTC services $\xi$ is set at 0.5; that is, half-time of one child is required to care for one parent.\(^{21}\) We check the sensitivity of our results to this assumption by changing the amount of time needed for informal care. For comparison, according to The Georgetown University Long-Term Care Financing Project, 17% of the elderly in the United States needed LTC in year 2000. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the total expenditures for LTC services for the elderly in 2004 as $135 billion, or roughly $15,000 per impaired senior. Out-of-pocket spending constitutes about one-third of total LTC expenditures in the U.S., corresponding to 12% of GDP per capita in 2004. For China, Hu (2012) predicts a sharp increase in the ratio of disabled elders to potential caregivers due to the rapid aging of the population and rising prevalence of major chronic diseases. Therefore, we suspect our calibration of the LTC risk and expenditures are not likely to be exaggerated.

Of course, LTC is only one component of the general issue about old-age support. Gu and Vlosky (2008) report that the health care reform in the 1980s has resulted in fewer elderly being covered by the government provided health care system. For example, the fraction of urban residents that are covered by the health care system went down from 100% in the 1950s to 57% in 2003. They report that in 2002 and 2005, 64% of the urban seniors and 94% of the rural elders’ medical expenses were paid by their children or themselves. The pension system, which used to provide about 75-100% of the last wage earned, also went through a series of reforms since the 1980s. Currently, they estimate that only 50-60% of elders in

\(^{21}\) Here, we define disposable income in the model as the output net of government expenditures.
cities and 10% of elders in rural areas have a pension. They conclude that while China has been working on improving its old-age support system, the majority of elders consider children their main source of support. Consequently, we also examine the interaction of the LTC risk with different levels of government support during the retirement years.

3.5 Government Policies

Government expenditures were, on average, 14% of GDP in China from 1980 to 2011. Based on this information, we set the value of $G$ so that it is 14% of output in both the initial and the final steady states. As discussed previously, we assume that the labor and capital income tax rates, in both steady states are determined so that tax revenues exactly cover government expenditures. At the initial steady state, both the labor and capital income tax rates are set at 17.4%. At the final steady state, the capital income tax rate is set at 15.3% according to Liu and Cao (2007); the labor income tax rate is then set at 28% to balance the government budget. Along the transition path, we use the actual data on government expenditures for values of $G_t$. There is not detailed enough data to compute the tax rates using methods by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) or McDaniel (2007). We summarize our method of constructing labor and capital income tax rates for the 1980-2011 period and provide the data in the Appendix. For the period after 2011, we assume that both government expenditures and the tax rate gradually converge to their final steady state values in 10 years.

The Chinese government used to provide widespread pension coverage and medical care before the 1980s. The reforms introduced since then have been incomplete and insufficient. Gu and Vlosky (2008) report that in 2002 and 2005, 40-50% of the elderly in cities and more than 90% of the elderly in rural areas did not have a pension. According to Song, Storesletten, Wang, and Zilibotti (2014), the Chinese pension system provided a replacement rate of 60% to those retiring between 1997 and 2011 who were covered by the system. As the urban population was approximately 40% of the Chinese population from 1980-2011, we assume that the pension coverage rate was 25% of the population. Therefore, we set the average social security replacement rate at 15% (i.e., 60% × 25% = 15%) for the whole population. Note that the pension benefits are partially indexed to the wage growth in China. Here, we follow the same indexation as in Song, Storesletten, Wang, and Zilibotti (2014) when calculating the replacement rate. That is, 40% of pension benefits are indexed to wage growth. We assume that the social security program is self-financing and that

\[^{22}\text{See also He, Ning, and Zhu (2015) for a detailed account of the changes in the social security system in China.}\]
\[^{23}\text{Sin (2005) also reports a 60% replacement rate.}\]
\[^{24}\text{In other words, we approximate the pension benefit by a linear combination of the average past earnings of the retirees and the average earnings of current workers, with weights of 60\% and 40\%. That is, } S_{ij} = \]

14
the social security payroll tax rate $\tau_{ss}$ is endogenously determined to balance the budget in each period.

An important calibration issue is the determination of the consumption floor, $c$. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) report that old age expenditures on medical care and the existence of the right consumption floor are very important in explaining the elderly’s savings in the U.S. They estimate the consumption floor, which proxies for Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the U.S, to be 73% of mean medical expenditures.\footnote{Consumption floor of about $2,700 and mean medical expenses of $3,712 in 1998 dollars.}

Currently in China, there are no government provided programs similar to Medicaid. There is one program aimed at helping the elderly who do not have children, a job, and income called the “Five guarantees” program where eligible elders receive the five basics of life: food, clothing, housing, medical care, and burial after death. This program is not really designed for those facing LTC risks, however. For example, according to Wu and Caro (2009), elderly with infectious diseases, mental illness, and functional dependency (semi-bedridden or bedridden) are often excluded from these institutions.\footnote{China introduced a Minimum Living Standard Assistance (MLSA) program nationwide in 1999. This is aimed at helping the poor in general (Gao, Garfinkel, and Zhai (2009)).}

Given the lack of government provided assistance for LTC costs of the dire poor, we expect the consumption floor, which affects the most unlucky agents, to be significantly lower in China relative to the U.S. In our benchmark calibration, we set the consumption floor to 10% of mean medical expenses. In Section 5, we provide sensitivity of our results to this parameter, including a consumption floor equal to 73% of medical expenditures used for the US in De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010).

Table 5 summarizes the main results of our calibration exercise and Table 8 provides the data on the TFP growth rate, government expenditures, and the constructed tax rates that are used along the transition.

### 4 Results

We start this section by examining the key statistics of the calibrated economy at both the initial and the final steady states. The initial steady state is calibrated to mimic the economic and demographic conditions in China in 1980, while the final steady state, which is assumed to be reached in 150 years, represents the economy with the one-child policy. Next, we examine the time series path of the savings rate along the transition path to the

$0.6 \times e_{past}^{j} + 0.4 \times e_{current}^{j}$. Here, $e_{past}^{j}$ represents the average past earnings of the retirees with age $T + j$, and $e_{current}^{j}$ is the average earnings of current workers. For simplicity, we obtain $e_{past}^{j}$ by discounting the average earnings of current workers $l$ years back using the growth rate of TFP factor, $\gamma$, that is, $e_{past}^{j} = e_{current}^{j} \times (1/\gamma)^{l}$.

Here, $l$ represents the number of years from the time of their retirement, i.e., $l = j - 5$.\footnote{Here, $l$ represents the number of years from the time of their retirement, i.e., $l = j - 5$.}
Table 5: Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>capital income share</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δ</td>
<td>capital depreciation rate</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ</td>
<td>risk aversion parameter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>TFP factor</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>β</td>
<td>time discount factor</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>goods cost of LTC services</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ξ</td>
<td>time cost of LTC services</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>z ∈ {H, L}</td>
<td>permanent life-time labor ability</td>
<td>{1.79, 1.0}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>government expenditures</td>
<td>14% of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>social security replacement rate</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ_{initial}^{1-α} - 1</td>
<td>initial steady state TFP growth rate</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ_{final}^{1-α} - 1</td>
<td>final steady state TFP growth rate</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n_{initial}</td>
<td>initial steady state total fertility rate</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n_{final}</td>
<td>final steady state total fertility rate</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

new steady state.

4.1 Steady State

The results presented in Table 6 show that the initial steady state of the calibrated model matches several key aspects of the Chinese economy in 1980, including the saving rate, the return to capital, and the demographic structure. The saving rate is 20.5% at the initial steady state, while the Chinese net national saving rate was, on average, 20.9% in the late 1970s. The return to capital generated by the model at the initial steady state is 15%, which is mostly due to the relatively high TFP growth rate to which the initial steady state is calibrated. Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) argue that the return to capital was, indeed, quite high in China in the 1980s, about 12% between 1978 and 1985.\footnote{Please see panel a in Figure 8 (in Section 4.3) where we compare the return to capital implied in this model along the transition with the estimates provided by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) between 1978 and 2005.}

The demographic structure at the initial steady state is also consistent with the Chinese data. For instance, the share of population aged 65+ at the initial steady state is 13%, while the share of the Chinese population aged 65+ was about 11% in 1980.\footnote{Please see Figure 7 (in Section 4.3) for the detailed population distribution by age in the model versus the data.}

The final steady state of the economy is generated by simply changing the fertility rate from 2.0 to 0.65 and the growth rate of TFP factor from 6.2% to 2.0% while keeping the rest of the parameters the same as at the initial steady state.\footnote{The payroll tax rate is also different between the two steady states. In the initial steady state, the social...}
final steady state is much lower (7.4%) than that at the initial steady state. This is due to
the dramatic change in the population structure triggered by the one-child policy and the
lower TFP growth rate. Elderly individuals save much less than working-age individuals,
and the one-child policy substantially increases the elderly population share, i.e., from 13%
at the initial steady state to 29% at the final steady state. The lower TFP growth rate
also contributes to the lower return to capital at the final steady state.

Table 6: Properties of the Steady States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Initial steady state</th>
<th>Final steady state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The saving rate in 1970s</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly population share (65+)</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of the elderly in LTC</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to capital (r)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage (w)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security payroll tax (τss)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate capital</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate labor</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output per person</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output per household</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 2, we display individual savings and net transfers at the initial and final steady
states. Panel (a) in Figure 2 documents average assets by the age of the individual. At the
initial steady state, the maximum amount of savings is about 2.5 times household income
given an average household income of one) and individuals leave more than household
income’s worth of assets as bequests at age 90. At the final steady state, individuals accumu-
late more assets, until the age of 80, compared to the initial steady state, and deplete
them by age 90. In panel (b) of Figure 2, the vertical axis measures the average amount of
transfers (where positive numbers indicate a net transfer from the children to the parent,
and negative numbers indicate a net transfer from the parent to the children), and the hori-
zontal axis measures the age of the children. When the children are 20 years old, the parent
is 55 years old. The parent retires at age 60, when the children are 25 years old. The initial
steady state is characterized by large intervivos transfers to children before they reach 40
years. After the children are older than 40 (and the parent is older than 75), children start
making transfers to their parents. These transfers start at 0.15 which correspond to about

security replacement rate is set at 15%, which results in a payroll tax rate of 2.5%. At the final steady state,
a higher payroll tax rate (7.8%) is needed to balance the budget due to a much larger share of the elderly
population.

Note that the one-child policy affects the national saving rate via two channels. First, it hampers the
original family insurance for long-term care risk and thus encourages precautionary saving. Second, a lower
fertility rate increases the elderly population share, which reduces the national saving rate through the
compositional effect. Our calibrated model implies that the second channel dominates the first channel at
the steady state.
Figure 2: Savings and Transfers by Age

(a) Individual Assets by Age

(b) Net Transfers from the Children

45% of income per person from parents to children when the average child is 20 years old. As the children and the parent gets older transfers to children decline. When the parent is 90 years old the transfers to parent reaches about 0.04 which corresponds to 10% of income per person.\footnote{In Section 4.3 we compare the implications of the model on intervivos transfers, along the transition that corresponds to late 2000s, with the data on intervivos transfers based on the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) conducted in 2013.} At the final steady state transfers to children are much smaller and transfers from children to parents are much larger compared with the initial steady state.

4.2 Transitions

In this section, we present our main results where we examine the time path of the saving rate starting from the initial steady state and along the transition path to the new steady state. We shock the initial steady state in 1980 by imposing the one-child policy (i.e., the fertility rate is immediately reduced from 2.0 to 0.65). The transition is assumed to take 150 years while the effect of the one-child policy is felt 20 years later as one-child cohorts only start to enter the economy in the year 2000.\footnote{Note that by only reducing the fertility rate to its value at the final steady state, the demographic structure in the economy will never converge to a new stable structure. Thus, we assume that the size of each new cohort will start to decrease exogenously at the rate of $0.65^{1/35} - 1$ after a certain number of years (70 years in the benchmark case). Here, the rate of $0.65^{1/35} - 1$ is simply the population growth rate in the final steady state. We also explore other assumptions as robustness checks for this issue.} As described in the calibration section, we use the actual data from 1980-2011 on the TFP growth rate, government expenditures
and taxes along the transition path and assume perfect foresight for all these components. We compare the saving rates along the transition path generated by the model to the Chinese data to evaluate if the model is capable of accounting for the rise in the Chinese saving rate. Next, we evaluate the driving forces behind the rise in the Chinese saving rate by running counterfactual experiments to isolate the effect of the TFP growth rate, demographic changes, labor income risk, LTC risk, and government policy on the saving rate between 1980 and 2011.

Figure 3 displays the saving rates generated by the benchmark economy versus the data starting in 1970. Overall, the time series path of the saving rate generated by the model mimics the data remarkably well. The model not only accounts for the rise in the saving rate from 1980 to 2011 but also captures the major fluctuations in the saving rate in the 1990s. In the data, as summarized in Table 7, the saving rate increases from 15.6% in 1981 to 27.5% in 1995. After a period of brief decline, the saving rate again rises, from 20.9% in 2000 to 37.9% in 2010. In the benchmark economy, the saving rate increases from 16.2% in 1981 to 24.8% in 1995 and from 19.5% in 2000 to 34.9% in 2010. In addition, some other key statistics along the transition path generated by the model are also consistent with the data, which we will discuss further in Section 4.3.

Figure 3: The Chinese Saving Rate: Model vs. Data

In the rest of this section, we examine the contribution of each of these factors to the

\footnote{In Section 5, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the perfect foresight assumption, and find that this assumption does not have a large impact on our main results. Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006) also show a rather small impact of the perfect foresight assumption in a similar framework.}
increase in the saving rate by running counterfactual experiments. We start by generating the saving rate with only the assumed change in demographics playing a role. We use constant government expenditures (as a % of GDP) and constant TFP growth rates and eliminate the individual income and LTC risks. In the rest of the experiments we add each one of these components one by one to isolate their effects on the saving rate.

In the first experiment, we only feed in the changes in demographics due to the one-child policy to the model economy. We eliminate the risk associated with LTC by setting $h = 0$, which means that all the parents live a healthy life until they die. We set the TFP growth rate from 1980 to 2050 to its average value for that period (5.8%) and fix government expenditures at their average rate from 1980-2011 along the entire transition path and eliminate government surpluses or deficits by assuming tax rates that exactly balance the government budget constraint. We label the saving rate generated in this case as “none” in the first panel of Figure 4. The results of this experiment reveal a declining pattern for the saving rate from 15.0% in the initial benchmark to 13.3% in 2010. This decline happens for two reasons. First, the increase in the share of elderly put a downward pressure on the saving rate. Second, bequests in this economy decline due to the one-child policy.

Figure 4: Decomposition of the Chinese Saving Rate

In the second experiment, we add the individual income risk to the model. The saving rate labeled “IR” in the first panel of Figure 4, incorporates both the role of changing demographics and income risk on the saving rate. The difference in the saving rates between the first and the second experiments reveal the impact of the individual income risk quite
clearly. It results in a parallel shift in the saving rate in all years by four percentage points. As we will discuss in more detail in Section 5, changing the assumption about the year at which individuals start facing the income risk mainly changes the year at which the saving rate jumps up.

In the third experiment, we add the time series path of the government expenditures and tax rates that yield a government surplus that mimics the data. The resulting saving rate labeled “IR+Gov” in the second panel of Figure 4 indicates that changes in government finances that took place in this time period do not seem to have played a major role in the time path of the national saving rate.

In the fourth experiment, we feed in the observed TFP growth rate between 1980 and 2011. China experienced a surge in productivity after the 1980s with several fluctuations in the 1990s and 2000s. The results of this experiment, that are displayed in the first panel of Figure 5, suggest that changes in the TFP growth rate played an important role mostly in the major fluctuations in the Chinese saving rate observed in this time period.

Finally, adding the LTC risk generates the saving rate labeled “benchmark” in the second panel of Figure 5. The results suggest that LTC risks played an important role in the increase in the saving rate, especially during the period after 2000. Note that the differential impact of LTC risks, before and after 2000, found here highlights the importance of the interaction

34Figure 18 in Section 7 displays the time path of the TFP growth rate that is used in our simulations. We checked the sensitivity of our results to the TFP series provided by the Penn World Tables as well. Both TFP series display similar fluctuations leading to similar conclusions regarding the saving rates in this period.
between the lack of old-age support and the demographic changes in China. The impact of LTC risks on precautionary saving largely depends on the availability of insurance against these risks. After the one-child policy was implemented in 1980, more and more one-child families enter the economy and the original family insurance against LTC risks is gradually destroyed; therefore, the impact of LTC risks on precautionary saving becomes larger over time.

Table 7: The Saving Rates Along the Transition Path

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decomposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 1: None</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 2: Exp.1+IR</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp.3: Exp.2+Gov</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 4: Exp.3+TFP</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. 5: All three (= Bench)</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quantitative results summarized in Table 7 show that the benchmark economy is capable of accounting for more than 80% of the rise in the saving rate since the 1980s. These results also highlight the importance of the LTC risk in influencing the time-series path of the saving rate. The interaction between the LTC risk and the change in demographics due to the one-child policy, however, is not easily apparent in these experiments. In order to investigate this interaction better, we consider two alternative cases. In the first case we, keep all the features of the benchmark economy the same except for the one-child policy. Since it is not obvious what the population growth rate would have been without the one-child policy, we work with two different assumptions. In the first assumption, we keep the fertility rate fixed at its initial steady state value of 2 children per parent. In the second assumption, we let the fertility rate decline gradually along the transition path until 2050 where it reaches the replacement rate of one child per parent. Results of these experiments are displayed in Figure 6 as “No OCP” and “No OCP II”, respectively. We find that the rise in the saving rate after 2000 is significantly smaller under both assumptions. The saving rate in 2010 for this case is 26.4% instead of the 34.9% in the benchmark. Even though parents face LTC risks, they can still rely on their children to help them. Therefore, saving rate do not rise as dramatically.

The sensitivity of this result to the calibration of the economy is discussed at length in Section 5.

Ideally, we would want to have endogenous fertility choices. Given the computational burden that such a framework would entail, we instead examine the impact of these two different assumptions about the fertility rate. The second assumption is considered because the fertility rate in China would have declined even without the one-child policy due to the economic growth.
Next, we examine a case where we eliminate both the LTC risk and the one-child policy from the benchmark economy. The results for this case are displayed together with the results from the first case in panel (b) of Figure 6. As the figure shows, the impact of LTC risks on the saving rate is substantially smaller in the economy without the one-child policy, and it does not significantly increase over time. The saving rate in 2010 is 24.4% in this case. These results suggest that LTC risks alone cannot generate a substantial rise in the saving rate if the one-child policy was not implemented.

These two experiments reveal that the interaction between the LTC risk and demographics plays an important role in the increase in the saving rate especially after 2000 as more and more families with only one child have started entering the economy. The saving rate would have increased from 20% in the 1980s to around 25% in 2010 in the absence of the LTC risk or the one-child policy. The presence of these facts, on the other hand, results in the saving rate to rise to around 35% in 2010.

4.3 Additional Properties of the Benchmark Model

In this section, we investigate whether our model is capable of matching the data in other relevant dimensions, such as population dynamics, the return to capital, the wage rate, intervivos transfers and age specific saving rates.

The first panel of Figure 7 plots the elderly population share along the transition path. The share of population aged 65+ in the model is constant before 2000. This is simply due
to the fact that one-child households did not enter the economy until 2000. As more and more one-child households enter the economy after 2000, this share increases and is projected to rise to 30% by 2040. The population dynamics along the transition path generated by the model is reasonably consistent with the data. The second panel of Figure 7 shows the population distribution by age at the initial steady state. The model is not able to match the fluctuations around the age of 20 in the population distribution precisely as they are a consequence of some earlier extreme events in the economy (such as the Chinese Great Famine between 1959-1961), which are not modeled here.

Figure 7: Demographics

Next, we check the model generated return to capital and the wage rate against their counterparts in the data. Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) carefully measure the return to capital in China between 1978 and 2005 using data from China’s national accounts. They address many of the potential measurement problems and provide data on the return to capital under different assumptions such as removing residential housing, agriculture and mining, or including inventories in the definition of the capital stock. The model generated return to capital as well as the data obtained from Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) are given in panel (a) of Figure 8.\(^{37}\) Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015) provide long time-series data on nominal wages in China. Panel (b) in Figure 8 displays real wages constructed by using their wage and CPI data and the model generated wage rates, all normalized to one in 1980. Both of these endogenous variables track their counterparts in the data reasonably.

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\(^{37}\)Our definition of the capital stock includes inventories; therefore, the relevant comparison with the data is given in Figure 8 of Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) who were kind enough to provide the data.
Our framework has sharp implications for intervivos transfers between the parents and the children as well as age specific saving rates. In the next two cases, we compare these implications of the model with the micro level data. There are few caveats, however, that make the comparison between the data and the model imperfect, so we refrain from trying to calibrate our model to these particular observations and instead use them to mostly assess the qualitative aspects of the forces in place.

The China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) has been used extensively to document the level of intergenerational support and intervivos transfers in China. We use the CHARLS 2013 wave dataset to examine whether the intervivos transfers generated in the model are in line with the observations in the data. CHARLS provides data on transfers between the children and the parents (head of the household) and information on their schooling and ages. However, the data on transfers are only between parents and their non-cohabiting children. As transfers (or implicit transfers) also occur between parents and their cohabiting children, and sometimes these types of transfers can be even larger than other transfers, the net transfers estimated from the CHARLS data may not reflect what is captured in the model fully. In addition, the co-residence in different stages of life may imply inter-generational transfers from different directions. Since specific information on transfers between parents and their cohabiting children is not known in the data, we refrain from trying to calibrate our model to this particular observation but examine the qualitative implications of the data. We construct the measure of the net transfers from children
to their parents using the same strategy as in Choukhmane, Coeurdacier, and Jin (2013). The sample consists of 1978 families from urban area. Panel (a) of Figure 9 summarizes the profile of the net transfers from children to parents as a share of disposable income per person in the model as well as its counterpart in the CHARLS data, where the data line is fitted by regressing the net transfer variable on age and age-squared. The vertical axis measures the average amount of transfers (where positive numbers indicate a net transfer from the children to the parent, and negative numbers indicate a net transfer from the parent to the children), and the horizontal axis measures the age of the children. When the children are 20 years old, the parent is 55 years old. The parent retires at age 60, when the children are 25 years old. According to these results, in families where the average age of the children is 20, transfers to children constitute about 40% of income. As children get older, transfers to them decline. In the data, after the average child reaches 35 years of age, net transfers turns positive indicating transfers from the children to their parents. In the model children continue receiving transfers longer. Nevertheless, the qualitative properties of the data resemble the model reasonably well.

Figure 9: Intervivos Transfers and Saving Rates

Chamon and Prasad (2010) provide documentation on saving rates as a function of the age of the household in the cross-section of households in China for the years 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. According to their results, the age-savings profiles start exhibiting a U-shaped pattern starting in the mid-1990s, indicating that young households save a lot more

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As CHARLS only provides information on transfers between parents and their non-cohabiting children, we restrict our sample to families who do not have cohabiting children.
of their income than was the case a decade ago. Explanations for this observation include the role of shifts in earnings uncertainty in Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2013); incomplete pension reforms and the changes in life cycle earnings profiles in Song and Yang (2010); and changes in the demographic structure in Ge, Yang, and Zhang (2012), among others. Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015), however, find that constructing age-specific saving rates based on the household approach contains several biases especially if a large fraction of households comprise members that are at very different life-cycle stages. They report that the age-saving rates after correcting for these biases are in line with the predictions of the life-cycle model.

Given the large literature that followed the original findings in Chamon and Prasad (2010), we present the age-saving rate profiles generated in our model. However, we note that the age of the household in the model economy is subject to the same aggregation bias discussed in Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015). In panel (b) of Figure 9, we display the age-saving rate profiles generated by the model economy during the transition years of 2000, 2005, and 2010. We find that in the model economy successive cohorts do save more in younger ages than in earlier cohorts. This is mainly due to the interaction between LTC risks and changes in demographics that the model is calibrated to. We note that the high saving rates in early ages stem from the family structures that contain a young and a middle aged member at the same time.

5 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to some of the parameters and the modeling choices we made.

5.1 Consumption Floor

An important parameter that is difficult to precisely estimate is the value assigned to $c$. As we discussed in Section 3.5 De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) find that the level of the consumption floor plays an important role in explaining the elderly’s savings in the U.S. They estimate the consumption floor, which proxies for Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the U.S, to be 73% of mean medical expenditures. Given the lack of programs like Medicaid in China, we set the consumption floor to 10% of mean medical expenses in our benchmark calibration. In Figure 10, we show the sensitivity of our results to three other values for the consumption floor: 5%, 20%, and 73% of medical expenditures. As expected, the consumption floor plays an important role in the time path of the saving rate, especially in the increase since the 2000s. If the consumption floor were as high as it
is in US, then the model-implied saving rate in China in 2010 would have been 26.2% in 2010 as opposed to the 34.9% found in the benchmark case. Quantitatively the saving rate in this case is very similar to the results of the experiment without the one-child policy. In other words, if the Chinese government were to provide an assistance program against the LTC risks that substituted for the informal care provided by the family, then the increase in the saving rate would have been much smaller. This case represents a lower bound for the quantitative importance of the LTC risks in the face of the demographic changes faced in China.

Figure 10: Role of the Consumption Floor

5.2 Social Security

Of course, LTC is only one component of the general issue about old-age support. Generosity of the social security system plays an important role in the saving behavior of the elderly. In our benchmark calibration, we set the replacement rate at 15%, along the transition path and at the new steady-state, which reflects the level of coverage at the national level in the mid-2000s. Given the aging of the population, the social security tax rate in the benchmark increases from 2.6% in 1980 to around 8.2% in 2080. In this section, we examine the results of two counterfactual experiments. First, we examine an alternative case where the replacement rate is set to 30% for the entire time period. In this case, the social security tax rate starts at 5.2% and reaches 16.4% by 2080. In the second case, we fix the social security tax rate after 2011 at 3%, consistent with our benchmark calibration, and adjust
the social security benefits to balance its budget in each period. This case represents the concern that the Chinese government may not be able to provide the promised social security benefits in the future. Replacement rates in this case decline from 15% in 2011 to around 6% by 2040.

**Figure 11: Saving Rates and Social Security**

The saving rate generated with a 30% replacement rate is plotted (together with the benchmark results) in panel (a) of Figure 11. As expected, higher social security benefits imply lower saving rates along the transition path. The saving rate in 2010 is 27.9% with a 30% replacement rate, as opposed to 34.9% in the benchmark case with a 15% replacement rate. In addition, similar to LTC risks, the impact of the social security replacement rate on saving is larger after 2000. This is due to its interaction with LTC risks as social security benefits provide partial insurance against LTC risks.

The saving rate generated for the second experiment where the social security tax rate is kept constant after 2011 while the replacement rate is allowed to decline to satisfy the social security administrations budget constraint is plotted in panel (b) of Figure 11. The results indicate that reduced social security benefits after 2011 do not only substantially increase the saving rates after 2011 but also increase the saving rates years before 2011 as individuals are forward-looking.

39 Sin (2005) provides an extensive study of the challenges faced by the existing old age insurance system in China. Song, Storesletten, Wang, and Zilibotti (2014) also discuss that the current social security system does not seem to be sustainable and will require a significant adjustment in either contributions or benefits.
5.3 Different Calibrations of LTC Risk

As shown previously, the LTC risk plays a key role in shaping the Chinese saving rates since 1980. In this section, we show the sensitivity of our results to different calibrations of LTC risks. We consider two alternative cases: (1) the time cost of LTC is reduced from half-time to one-third time of one child, (2) the risk of having LTC needs increases by age.

Panel (a) of Figure 12 displays the results from the first case. As expected, a smaller time cost of LTC implies lower saving rates. With the time cost equivalent to one-third time of one child, the model implied saving rate in China in 2010 would have been slightly above 30% as opposed to the 35% found in the benchmark case. A well-observed feature about LTC risks is that the risk increases as individuals age. According to Gu and Vlosky (2008), an increase in each additional year of age increases the risk of having long-term care needs by 11% in China. In the second case, we capture this feature of LTC risks by assuming that the conditional risk of having LTC shock (i.e., $\Gamma_{01}$) increases by 11% as the age increases by one year. We then rescale these conditional probabilities of having LTC needs so that the fraction of the elderly population in LTC status is the same as in the benchmark case. Panel (b) of Figure 12 shows the results from this case. As can be seen, the results remain similar to the benchmark results.
5.4 Government Budget

In our benchmark model, government expenditures and tax revenues are not always equal to each other along the transition path, and a transfer proportional to labor income is used to balance the government’s per period budget constraint. We interpret these transfers as government deficit/surplus and graph them in panel (a) of Figure 13 together with data obtained from China Statistical Yearbook-2014 on tax revenues and government consumption expenditures. Given that the tax rates were constructed using this data and the model can account for the path of the real return to capital and the wage rate reasonably well, it is not surprising that the model can account for the government budget deficit/surplus observed during this period well.

While this way of modeling the government substantially simplifies our analysis, it misses the actual saving done by the Chinese government who has been investing in financial and physical assets at home or abroad. Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2011) measure government savings using the flow of funds data that accounts for other items such as the revenues of state-owned enterprises, for the time period 1992-2007 (the period for which there is consistent data on the relevant subcategories). While modeling state-owned enterprises is beyond the scope of this paper, we consider an alternative case in which the government does not redistribute government surplus/deficits and instead is allowed to accumulate capital over time. The implications of this case on government saving are displayed in panel (b) Figure 13. While the model-generated government saving is still lower than the data presented in Yang, Zhang, and Zhou (2011), its impact on national savings, presented in panel (a) of Figure 14, is quite small.
We also check the sensitivity of our benchmark results to the assumption about distributing the government surplus in a proportional way to labor income. In the alternative case in which the transfer takes the lump-sum form, it provides relatively more insurance (especially for the poor) compared to proportional transfers. Panel (b) in Figure 14 shows the sensitivity of our results to this different way of redistributing back government surplus/deficits in each period. As expected, lump-sum transfers reduce the saving rate in the
model, but only slightly compared to the benchmark case.

5.5 Different Individual Income Risk

In the benchmark model, the magnitude of income risk in China is constant over time, mostly due to the lack of data and relevant empirical estimates. There has been some evidence suggesting that the size of income risk facing Chinese has increased over time. In the early 1980s after the start of the Chinese economic reform, most jobs were government-related and came with great security (the so called “Iron Rice Bowls”). These “Iron Rice Bowls” were gradually broken as the Chinese economy went through a series of major reforms. He, Huang, Liu, and Zhu (2014) show that the large scale state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in 1997 substantially increased the income risk facing Chinese. Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2013) report trend growth in both the mean and the variance of total household income since 1997. Due to the lack of data, it is hard to precisely measure the annual increase in the magnitude of the income risk in China from the 1980s to the 2010s. However, the potential impact of increasing income risk in the model can be gleaned from the following exercise where we examine the sensitivity of our results to different assumptions about the year in which the individual income risk becomes operational. As shown in Figure 15, changing the year in which there is an unexpected increase in the income risk changes the year at which the saving rate jumps up. Therefore, it is expected that the time path of the saving rate in the model would simply become steeper if the magnitude of income risk increased gradually over time.

Figure 15: Income Risk Starting in Different Years
5.6 Alternative Fertility Rate After the One-child Policy

In the benchmark case, we assume that the fertility rate implied by the one-child policy is 1.3 per couple as this value is explicitly written in the policy rules. We argue that in general the policy is binding as its detailed rules impose strong incentives and penalties. However, it is worth noting that some special families, such as ethnic minorities and families facing special conditions (e.g., a disabled first child), were given permission to exceed the quota. Consequently, some estimates of the fertility rate after the one-child policy are equal to 1.6 per couple. In this section, we provide results for this case as a robustness check. As shown in Figure 16, when the fertility rate after the one-child policy is set to 1.6 per couple, the model implied saving rate in China in 2010 is slightly lower than in the benchmark case, while the time-series path of the saving rate remains the same.

Figure 16: Alternative Fertility Rate After the One-child Policy

5.7 Perfect Foresight

In this experiment, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumption of perfect foresight by running the same experiment as in Chen, İmrohoroglu, and İmrohoroglu (2006). In this counterfactual experiment, we make the extreme assumption that households always
expect the TFP growth rate to be 7.8% (i.e., the average value of the period 1980-2011) while getting hit with the actual TFP growth rates every period until 2011. After 2011, their expectations are aligned with the Goldman Sachs forecasts that are also used in our benchmark case. The results from this experiment are labeled “nonchanging expectations” in Figure 17, which displays the extent to which expectations may play a role in the relationship between TFP and the saving rate. As shown in Figure 17, the effect of the perfect foresight assumption is rather small. When households are assumed to expect a constant TFP growth rate, the time-series path of the saving rate, while smoother, remains similar to the benchmark case.

Figure 17: The Role of Perfect Foresight

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we use a model economy that is populated with altruistic agents, calibrate it to the Chinese economy, and examine the role of demographics, fiscal policy, long-term care costs, individual income risk, and the productivity growth rate in generating changes in the saving rate. Our results indicate that the interaction between the LTC risk and demographics plays an important role in the increase in the saving rate especially after 2000 as more and more families with only one child have started entering the model economy. We find that the saving rate would have increased from 20% in the 1980s to around 25%
in 2010 in the absence of the LTC risk or the one-child policy. The presence of these facts, on the other hand, results in the saving rate to rise to around 35% in 2010. Changes in the TFP growth rate account for most of the fluctuations in the saving rate during this period.

Our experiments reveal that the possibility of inadequate support during old age, by the government or the family members, is capable of generating large increases in the saving rate in China. While it is difficult to calibrate the risks faced by the elderly in China precisely, it is not likely that we have exaggerated these risks. There are several issues we have abstracted from, such as medical costs other than LTC costs, increases in LTC costs due to longevity, or the sustainability of the social security system, which contribute to concerns about old-age support in China. Going forward, as the Chinese government enacts measures to help the problems faced by the elderly, the saving rate will likely decline.

References


7 Online Appendix

In this section, we present the data that is used in our simulations. We use annual data from the China Statistical Yearbook-2014 released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm, starting from 1978, for GDP by expenditure, Consumption, Government Expenditures, Investment, and Net Exports in the construction of the time-series data on TFP and the net national saving rate. Employment data (persons employed) is from The Conference Board Total Economy Database (January 2014, http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/).

We construct the capital stock using the Perpetual Inventory Method given by:

\[ K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \]

where \( I_t \) is investment and the depreciation rate, \( \delta \) is assumed to be 10%. The initial capital stock is calculated using:

\[ K_0 = I_0 / (\delta + g) \]

where \( g \) is the average growth rate of GDP between 1960 and 2011. For investment series, we use “Gross Capital Formation” series (which is inclusive of inventories) from NBS as recommended by Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006). We deflate all nominal series by the GDP deflator (base year 2000) from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. TFP series, \( A_t \), is calculated as: \( A_t = \frac{Y_t}{K_t^{\alpha}N_t^{1-\alpha}} \). Figure 18 displays the resulting TFP series between 1980 and 2010 as well as the projections used until 2050 in our simulations. In the same figure, we also provide the TFP series obtained from Penn World Tables for comparison reasons (https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762).

It is challenging to measure the average effective capital and labor income tax rates in China accurately due to lack of detailed data. We have experimented with several different possibilities. In the benchmark results, we use the findings in Liu and Cao (2007) for the capital income tax rate. They measure the average effective tax rate at the firm level, using a panel data on 425 listed companies in China’s stock market between 1998 and 2004. Based on their findings, we set the capital income tax rate to be 15.28% from 1980 onwards. Next, we calculate the capital income tax revenues as the capital income tax rate times capital income. Capital income is calculated as capital share times GDP net of depreciation. Capital share is provided by Bai and Qian (2010) for the 1978-2007 period, carefully accounting for several data related issues. Capital depreciation rate is assumed to be 10% and capital stock is from Berleman et al (2014). Labor income tax revenues are calculated as total tax.

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40 The series we employ are consistent with Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015) who provide macroeconomic time series on China both at the annual and quarterly levels.

41 TFP forecasts are obtained from Goldman Sachs (2003)
revenues minus the capital income tax revenues where labor income is calculated as labor share (from Bai and Qian (2010)) times GDP. Lastly, labor income tax rate is calculated as labor income tax revenues divided by labor income.

Table 8 displays the data for the TFP growth rate, government expenditures as a share of GDP, and the tax rates that are used in our simulations.
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