Main Publications

Market design for redistributions
Conflict mediation and the distributional approach to auctions
 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Peace:  Implementability versus Security, JET 2019 
 Bidding Collusion without Passive Updating, J. Math Econ, 2019
How would secondary markets affect the design of auctions?
Optimal Auction with Resale, Econometrica 2002
Collusion via Resale (joint with Rod Garratt and Thomas Tröger), Econometrica 2009
What if bidders are financially constrained and winners can default?
If it is costly to solicit bids, when to wait for more bids and when to stop and make the sale?
Optimal Search Auctions (joint with Jacques Crémer and Yossi Spiegel), JET 2007
Auctions with Costly Information Acquisition (joint with Jacques Crémer and Yossi Spiegel), ET 2009
Interactions between a blocking coalition and its outsiders
Core Equivalence Theorem with Production (joint with Siyang Xiong), JET 2007