Professor and Christopher J. Grimes Fellow in Microeconomic Theory
Ph.D. University of Minnesota, 1999
Office: SSC 4026
Telephone: 519-661-2111 Ext. 85461
Auction Theory; Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design; General Equilibrium; Game Theory
“Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Peace: Implementability versus Security,” Journal of Economic Theory, v180, 135-166 (March 2019)
"Collusion via Resale" (joint with Rod Garratt and Thomas Troger), Econometrica, v77, n4, 1095-1136 (July 2009, Articles).
"Core Equivalence Theorem with Production" (joint with Siyang Xiong), Journal of Economic Theory, v137, n1, 246-270 (November 2007).
"Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, v70, n6, 2197-2224 (November 2002, Articles).