Auctions and Mechanism DesignWork by Goltsman, Pavlov, and Zheng mostly focuses on the theory and design of auctions and other market institutions in dynamic environments that involve information exchange, resale, collusion, renegotiation, and financial constraints. The presence of these confounding factors gives rise to new economic questions and demands development of theoretical approaches that go beyond the traditional static framework of auction theory and mechanism design. The research can inform policymakers on how to design auctions given secondary markets and default risks, how to regulate communication between competitors, and how to fight collusion effectively.
List of Faculty:Maria Goltsman
List of Projects:Goltsman and Pavlov, "Communication in Cournot Oligopoly"
Pavlov, "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-Pay Auctions"
Zheng, "Existence of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in first-price auctions with resale"